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A RUDE AWAKENING: WHAT TO DO WITH
THE SLEEPWALKING DEFENSE?
Abstract: Some sleepwalkers commit acts of violence, or even murder,
in their sleep. Courts must decide what to do with criminal defendants
who raise a defense of sleepwalking. A brief review of common law
reveals that courts apply the defense inconsistently under various
doctrines of justification and excuse. Sleepwalking is a unique medical
phenomenon, and courts are poorly equipped to evaluate claims of
sleepwalking under existing common law defenses. This Note proposes
a single sleepwalking defense based on a balancing test that integrates
the medical understanding of sleepwalking.
INTRODUCTION
Scott Falater admits that in January 1997 he stabbed his wife
forty-four times and drowned her in the swimming pool at their Ari-
zona home.' Police struggled to find a motive for the crime.2 Falater
claims to have no recollection of the murder and believes he is not
culpable for the crime because he was asleep when he killed his wife.3
At Falater's trial, an expert in sleep disorders testified that Falater's
defense that he was sleepwalking during the killing was possible. 4
Sleepwalking, also known as somnambulism, is a sleep disorder in
which sleepers rise from their beds and perform various tasks while
still asleep.5 Occasionally, sleepwalkers commit crimes.° Scott Falater is
See State v. Fainter, No. CR1997-000928-A (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa County), appeal
docketed, No. CR1997-000928-A (Ariz. Ct. App.ful. 26, 2004), http://www.cofadl.state.az.us/
casefiles/cr/CR040398.pdf (providing case docket information for unreported opinion on
appeal); Greg LaMotte, Arizona Man Says He 1Vas Sleepwalking When He ailed Wife, at
littp://www.clin.com/U3/9805/08/sleepwalk.defense/  (May 8, 1998).
2 LaMotte, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Peter Fenwick, Somnambulism and the Law: A Review, 5 BEllAV. Set. & L. 343, 344 (1987).
6 See id.; Christopher Howard & P.T. D'Orban, Violence in Sleep: Medico-Legal Issues and
Two Case Reports, 17 Psvctiot.. MEn. 915, 916 (1987). A thirty-one-year-old fireman awoke
to find himself battering his wife with a shovel. Howard & D'Orban, supra, at 916. Upon
realizing what he had done, he fainted in shock. Id. He later regained consciousness,
found his wife dead, and attempted suicide. Id. The crime appeared entirely motiveless; he
had no recollection of the assault and enjoyed an amicable relationship with his wife. Id.
More recently, in Canada, Kenneth Parks drove to the home of his parents-in-law while
sleepwalking, attacked his father-in-law and killed his mother-in-law. R. Broughton et al.,
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not the first criminal defendant to raise sleepwalking in defense of his
actions.? The defense of sleepwalking is rarely asserted, and there ex-
ists little case law on the subject, leaving courts and criminal defen-
dants little or no precedent as guidance for applying the .defense.8
There has been inconsistency among courts faced with sleepwalk-
ing defenses; there are currently three different sleepwalking defenses
and no objective criteria for evaluating a defendant's claim of sleep-
walking.9 Criminal defendants raising the defense of sleepwalking face
the possibility of arbitrary and unprecedented judicial decisions due
to a lack of statutory, common-law, and scholarly precedent on the
sleepwalking defense.°
The problems of prosecuting, defending, and convicting defen-
dants who commit crimes while sleepwalking strike at the heart of
criminal law jurisprudence. 11 Criminal defendants facing prosecution
have their freedom and liberty at stake." Criminal justice and consti-
tutional protections strive to promote consistency in the prosecution
of criminal defendants to ensure that criminal defendants are not de-
prived of their liberty through arbitrary or unprecedented decisions."
Courts and legal scholars have focused on the philosophical nu-
ances of sleepwalking defenses and have neglected to answer more
practical questions, such as how to raise the sleepwalking defense at
trial, who should bear the burden of proving sleepwalking, and what
criteria should be considered in determining a sleepwalker's criminal
Homicidal Somnambulism: A Case Report, SLEEP, Apr. 1994, at 255. From all accounts, Parks
was very close with the victims, and seemed to lack motive for the attack. See id. at 256, 261.
The defense presented substantial evidence indicating that Parks was sleepwalking during
the attack, and consequently, the jury acquitted Parks of murder. See id. at 256-63.
7 See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 27 S.E.2d 659, 665 (Ga. 1943); Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 128
S.W. 871, 874 (Ky. 1910); Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 185 (1879); State v. Connell,
493 S.E.2d 292, 294-96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
8 Emily Grant, Note, While You Were Sleeping or Addicted: A Suggested Expansion of the
Automatism Doctrine to Include an Addiction Defense, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 997, 1009; see P.B.C.
Fenwick, Brain, Mind, Insanity, and the Law: Sleepwalkers Aren't Insane, 302 BRIT, MED..). 979,
979 (1991).
9 See Michael Corrado, Is There an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law?, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1529, 1554 (1994); Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary
Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 284-85 (2002). Compare People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 922
(Cal. 1974) (classifying sleepwalking as an unconsciousness defense), with McClain v. Indi-
ana, 678 N.E.2d 104, 106-07 (Ind. 1997) (classifying sleepwalking as an automatism de-
fense), with Tibbs, 128 S.W. at 874 (classifying sleepwalking as an insanity defense).
10 See Corrado, supra note 9, at 1554; Denno, supra note 9, at 284-85.
I See Den no, supra note 9, at 284-85.
12 See id.
13 See Corrado, supra note 9, at 1554; Denno, supra note 9, at 284-85.
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culpability." This Note argues that the courts should apply a consis-
tent balancing test in evaluating a defense of sleepwalking. 15
 Courts
should require the defendant to raise sleepwalking as an affirmative
defense, evaluated by comparing the facts of the case to a list of medi-
cal criteria indicative of sleepwalking behavior."'
This Note analyzes sleepwalking defenses in the context of medical
research on sleepwalking and advocates a defense suited to the avail-
able medical information." Part I begins with a summary of psycho-
logical and medical research on sleepwalking. 18 It then considers four
theories of a sleepwalker's mental capacity to commit crimes, question-
ing the degree of control exhibited by sleepwalkers and their ability to
make rational choices. 19 Part II discusses the incorporation of sleep-
walking defenses into the common-law legal doctrines of automatism,
unconsciousness, and insanity." Part HI first considers placing the bur-
den of proving the sleepwalking defense on the defendant as an
affirmative defense." It then considers placing the burden of proof on
the prosecution, who must establish that the defendant was not sleep-
walking at the time of the alleged crime." Part IV criticizes existing
sleepwalking defenses for their failure to compensate for the medical
differences between sleepwalking conduct and insane, automatist, or
unconscious criminal behavior." It argues that a defendant should bear
the burden of raising a sleepwalking defense. 24 Part IV proposes a new
sleepwalking defense, a multi-factored balancing test of objective crite-
ria specifically tailored to the unique medical and psychological charac-
teristics of sleepwalking.25
14 See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 256-319 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 262-319 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 26-59,265-319 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
19 See info notes 60-101 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 102-169 and accompanying text.
21
 See infra notes 172-188 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 207-255 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 313-319 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 256-319 and accompanying text.
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I. MEDICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SLEEPWALKING
A. Sleepwalking: A Medical and Psychological Perspective
Before assessing the legal status of sleepwalking defendants, it is
necessary to develop a basic understanding of what sleepwalking is
and how it affects the sleepwalker's mind and body. 26 Advances in
medical research on sleepwalking are beginning to expose the
strengths and weaknesses of current legal theories on the sleepwalk-
ing defense. 27 The medical description of sleepwalking helps to re-
solve the question of whether sleepwalking is a voluntary act for the
purposes of assigning criminal liability to defendants raising the de-
fense of sleepwalking."
Recent medical and psychological research has changed the way
doctors diagnose and treat sleepwalking episodes." Until the 1960s,
sleepwalking was thought to be a mental disorder related to dream-
ing." Recent studies have revealed that sleepwalking does not occur
in the dreaming phases of sleep, and therefore, sleepwalkers do not
act out dreams in their sleep as previously believed." Sleepwalking
episodes typically occur within two or three hours after the sleep-
walker falls asleep and generally last less than fifteen minutes. 32
26 Sec Fenwick, supra note 5. at 346-47; Lan Oswald & John Evans, On Serious Violence
During Sleepwalking, 147 BRIT.]. PSYCHIATRY 688, 690 (1985). In a personal narrative, one
doctor described his struggle with sleepwalking as follows:
I do think I know what these night wanderings are all about in my own life:
they are attempts to do what can't be done in the light—to say things left un-
said that still need to be said, to try somehow to touch, to recon with, the
ghost in every darkness.
John Stone, Night Wanderings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 14.
27 See infra notes 29-59 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 29-59 and accompanying text.
29 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 343; Carlos H. Schenck et al., A Polysomnographic and
Clinical Report on Sleep-Related Injury in 100 Adult Patients, 146 AM. J. PsvcinAmv 1166,
1170-71 (1989).
" PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE 700 (heir H. Kryger et at. eds., 3d ed.
2003); Prakash Masand et al., Sleepwalking, 51 AM. FAst. PtivsICIAN 649, 649 (1995).
31 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 700; see Fenwick, su-
pra note 5, at 344-45; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 649; William 1.1. Reid et al., Treatment
of Sleepwalking: A Controlled Study, 35 AM. J. PsYctio•nERAry 27, 28 (1981); Grant. supra
note 8, at 1007.
32 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, Supra note 30, at 701; K. Abe & M.
Shimakawa, Predisposition to Sleepwalking, 152 PsvcillATRIC NEUROLOGY 306, 306 (1966);
Peter Fenwick, Murdering While Asleep, 293 BRIT. MED. J. 574, 574 (1986); Ernest Hart-
mann, Night Terrors—Sleep Walking: Personality Characteristics, 11 SLEEP RFS. 121, 121 (1982);
Anthony Kales et al., Somnambulism: Clinical Characteristics and Personality Patterns, 37 AR-
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Sleepwalking in children is almost exclusively a physiological disorder
(a physical defect of the body), and not a psychological disorder (a
mental defect)," In adults, however, there may be a correlation be-
tween sleepwalking and psychological disorders, but this correlation
has not been confirmed in some studies. 34
 The balance of the avail-
able research suggests that the correlation between psychopathology
and sleepwalking is tenuous, at best, and psychopathology is certainly
not a prerequisite for sleepwalking." Episodes of sleepwalking are of-
ten brought on by stress and triggered by personal crises." Sleepwalk-
ing is more common among children than adults. 37 Children who
sleepwalk generally stop sleepwalking in their teens, and sleepwalking
becomes extremely rare beyond sixty years of age. 38 In old age, sleep-
walking may be a manifestation of other disorders such as delirium,
drug toxicity, or seizure disorder."
CHIVES GEN. PSYCIIIATRY 1406, 1407 (1986); Grant, supra note 8, at 1007; see Fenwick,
supra note 5, at 346; Mark W. Mahowald et al., Sleep Violence-Forensic Science Implications:
Polygraphic and Video Documentation, 35 J. FORENSIC SC1. 413, 426 (1990). But see Kavey et al.,
Somnambulism in Adults, 40 NEUROLOGY 749, 750 (1990) (observing frequent sleepwalking
episodes more than two-and-a-half hours into sleep).
33
 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Howard &
D'Orban, supra note 6, at 921; Kales et al., supra note 32, at 1410; sec J.V Gilmore Jr„ Mur-
dering While Asleep: Clinical and Forensic Issues, 4 FORENSIC REP. 455, 457 (1991); Oswald &
Evans, supra note 26, at 690.
" PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Kavey et al., su-
pra note 32, at 749. Adult sleepwalking appears to be a different medical phenomenon
from childhood sleepwalking. See Kavey et al., supra note 32, at 749. Compare Kales et al.,
supra note 32, at 1408, 1410 (finding 72% of adult sleepwalkers in the study were diag-
nosed with psychiatric disorders, including impulsivity, antisocial behavior, and hyponia-
nia; no patient was overtly psychotic), with D. Hartman et al., Is There a Dissociative Process in
Sleepwalking and Night Terrors!, 77 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 244, 246 (2001) (finding
significant psychologically traumatic experiences in 27% of sleepwalking or night terror
sufferers, most of whom were adults), and Howard & D'Orban, supra note 6, at 922 (sug-
gesting that sleep violence is a physiological phenomenon unrelated to psychological con-
ditions.)
35 See Howard & D'Orban, supra note 6, at 922, 924; Schenck, supra note 29, at 1171.
36 Reid et al., supra note 31, at 28; see Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 420; Masand et
al., supra note 30, at 650.
" PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SI.EEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Kales et al., su-
pra note 32, at 1406; Reid et al., supra note 31, at 28; see Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455;
Schenck, supra note 29, at 1170.
ss PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE,, supra note 30, at 701; Abe & Shima-
kawa, supra note 32, at 308; Kales et al., supra note 32, at 1408; Ismet Karacan, Patasomnias,
in SLEEP DISORDERS: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 131, 132 (Robert L. Williams et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1988).
• Masand et al., supra note 30, at 649:
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Sleepwalkers appear dazed, with a blank, staring expression, and
seldom respond to communication or actions of others. 4° Sleepwalk-
ing behavior generally is limited to sitting up in bed, occasional rising
and walking around, and rare instances of leaving the house:" Sleep-
walking movements are usually clumsy, but researchers disagree about
the potential extent of the sleepwalker's dexterity and motor skills. 42
Sleepwalking violence is often instigated by a bystander who attempts
to wake the sleepwalker. 43 Complex behavior while sleepwalking is
rare." Incidents of self-inflicted injuries and violence toward others
during episodes of sleepwalking are not uncommon. 45 Instances of
violent sleepwalking do not generally occur in isolation; they are usu-
ally accompanied by prior violent sleepwalking acts. 46 Researchers also
disagree about the clinical classification of sleepwalking as automa-
tism, which is a non-reflex act without conscious volition. 47
Sleepwalkers seldom remember what happened during an epi-
sode.48 They act confused and disoriented after being woken from
4° Anthony Kales et al., Hereditary Factors in Sleepwalking and Night Terrors, 137 Burr. j.
PsvcittivrRY 111, 111 (1980); Karacan, supra note 38, at 132; Masand et al., supra note 30,
at 649; see E.P. Sloan & E.M. Shapiro, An Overview of Sleep Physiology and Sleep Disorders, in
FORENSIC ASPECTS OF SLEEP 7, 21 (Colin Shapiro & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1997).
41 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 346; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 649; Sloan & Sha-
piro, supra note 40, at 21.
42 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE., supra note 30, at 701; Alexander
Bonkalo, Impulsive Acts and Confusional States During Incomplete Arousal from Sleep: Crimino-
logical and Forensic Implications, 28 Psvcittivritic Q. 400, 407 (1974); Fenwick, supra note 5,
at 346 ("The subject can carry out purposeful acts, many of which are highly complex....
Sleepwalkers have walked out onto fire escapes, fired guns, driven cars, sometimes with the
result of serious self-injury, or of injury to others."); Kales et al., supra note 32, at 1406;
Karacan, supra note 38, at 132; Kavey et al., supra note 32, at 749; Masand et al., supra note
30, at 650, 652 (suggesting that complicated goal-oriented activities during supposed
sleepwalking cast doubt on the patient's claim of sleepwalking); L.B. Raschka, Sleep and
Violence, 29 CAN. J. Psycnixruv 132, 133 (1984).
45 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701.
44 Kavey et al., supra note 32, at 749 (stating that "frenzied behavior or aggression to
persons or objects is infrequent"); Masand et al., supra note 30, at 650, 652.
45 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Kavey et al., SU-
pra note 32, at 750; see Fenwick, supra note 5, at 346; Schenck et al., supra note 29. at 1167,
1171.
15 See Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
47 Masand et al., supra note 30, at 650. One possible reason for the controversy over
sleepwalking's classification as automatism is the fear that courts might confuse the legal
definition of automatism with the medical definition of automatism. Howard & D'Orban,
supra note 6, at 922.
48 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701-02; Bonkalo,
supra note 42, at 407; Fenwick, supra note 32, at 574; Hartmann, supra note 32, at 121; 1{a- .
les et al., supra note 32, at 1406; Karacan, supra note 38, at 132; see Masand et al„ supra note
30, at 650 (suggesting that sleepwalking is not commonly accompanied by a recollection of
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their sleep." Researchers believe this is why sleepwalkers can be dan-
gerous, and their actions often result in violent behavior and injuries
to the sleepwalker and others.° Motivated or premeditated violence
suggests the patient was not sleepwalking. 5 i
The exact causes of sleepwalking are unknown, but relevant trig-
ger factors include the following: developmental disorders, stress,
medication or drug use, sleep deprivation, and environmental stim-
uli.° Sleepwalking often runs in the family suggesting that it is partly
an inheritable genetic condition.° Sleepwalking may be confused
with other sleep disorders such as sleep drunkenness and night ter-
rors.54 Sleep drunkenness is a gradual and incomplete wakening
where the sleeper's motor skills and consciousness remain impaired. 55
Night terrors are closely related to sleepwalking, except that night
terrors are shorter and more severe, accompanied by panic, scream-
ing, increased heart rate, and sweating. 56 Recent research suggests
the episode); Oswald & Evans, supra note 26, at 688. But see Schenck et al., supra note 29, at
1171 (stating that some adult sleepwalkers reported substantial recall of nighttime behav-
ior).
45 See Masand et al., supra note 30, at 650.
s° Id.
51 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
52 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Fenwick, supra
note 5, at 346, 347, 350, 354; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 457-58; Howard & D'Orban, supra
note 6, at 922; Brett R. Kuhn & Amyl Elliott, Efficacy of Behavioral Interventions for Pediatric
Sleep Disturbance, in TREATING SLEEP DISORDERS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF BEHAVIORAL
SLEEP MEDICINE 415, 429, 430 (Michael L. Perlis & Kenneth L. Lichstein eds., 2003); Ma-
sand et al., supra note 30, at 650-52.
53
 Abe & Shimakawa, supra note 32, at 306; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455; Kales et at.,
supra note 40, at 111 (finding that a litst-degree relative of a sleepwalker is ten times more
likely to sleepwalk than a member of the general population); Kales et al., supra note 32, at
1409; Kuhn & Elliott, supra note 52, at 429; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 650-51; Reid et
al., supra note 31, at 28. About 80% of sleepwalkers have an immediate family history of
sleepwalking or night terrors. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SILd:LP MEDICINE, HipYR note
30, at 700.
54 Kales et al., supra note 40, at 111-12; Raschka, supra note 42, at 132 (stating that al-
though most sleep-related violence is presumed to occur during sleepwalking, other sleep
disorders may lead to sleep violence); see SLEEP RESEARCH AND CLINICAI, PRACTICE 38
(Gene Usdin ed., 1973); Karacan, supra note 38, at 132;1 Catesby Ware, Sleep and Anxiety,
in SLEEP DISoRDERS: DIAGNOSIS AND TREA'T'MENT, supra note 38, at 189, 203. Although the
defense of somnambulism theoretically may cover all violence committed during sleep,
this Note is concerned only with the legal consequence of sleepwalking and does not ad-
dress the treatment of other sleep-related violence in the criminal law. A. McCall Smith &
C.M. Shapiro, supra note 40, at 1, 39.
Raschka, supra note 42, at 132.
543 Hartman et al., supra note 34, at 244; Howard & D'Orblin, supra note 6, at 921;
Karacan, supra note 38, at 134; Kuhn & Elliot, supra note 52, at 429; Ware, supra note 54, at
203 (noting that night terrors, unlike sleepwalking episodes, are commonly associated with
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that sleepwalking and night terrors may be the same physiological
disorder differing only in severity.° Complex goal-oriented behavior,
episodes lasting more than fifteen minutes, or episodes reportedly
occurring at a time of night when sleepwalking does not generally oc-
cur may indicate that the patient is faking an episode of sleepwalk-
ing.58 Sleepwalking is a rare phenomenon afflicting only 2.5% of the
general population.59
B. Philosophical Perspective on Sleepwalking: Criminal Culpability
Theories of criminal culpability focus on criminal intent (mens
rea) and criminal action (actus revs), both of which are required for
conviction of a defendant.° Generally, for a criminal defendant to be
held culpable, the prosecution must prove that the defendant conunit-
ted the act voluntarily.° Therefore, criminal defendants who success-
fully prove that they were sleepwalking during the alleged crime cannot
be convicted unless the prosecution establishes that sleepwalking is a
voluntary act. 62 Based on the available medical research, sleepwalking
behavior is neither obviously voluntary, nor obviously involuntary.°
Much of the recent discussion about sleepwalking defenses fo-
cuses on the behavior and state of mind of the sleepwalker at the time
of criminal misconduct.° The basic premise of sleepwalking defenses
psychiatric disorders such as depression. anxiety, aggression, obsessive-compulsive tenden-
cies, and phobicness).
57 Kales et al., supra note 40, at 111-12 (citing a common genetic and neurophysi-
ologic connection between sleepwalking and night terrors); Kales et al., supra note 32, at
1409; Kuhn & Elliot, supra note 52, at 429.
55 Masand et al., supra note 30, at 652; see PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDI-
CINE, supra note 30, at 704.
se Fenwick, supra note 5, at 346; Kales et al., supra note 40, at 111; Kavey et al., supra
note 32, at 749; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 420. Only 0.7% of adults sleepwalk ac-
cording to one study. Kavey et al., supra note 32, at 749.
60 See New jersey v. Overton, 815 A.2d 517, 522 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
61 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1962); Overton, 815 A.2d at 522.
62 See Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 25 U.C. DAVIS
L. Rev. 383,434-35 (1992).
e'5 A. McCall Smith & C.M. Shapiro, Sleep Law: A Challenge in Law and Medicine, in FO-
RENSIC ASPECTS OF SLEEP 1, 2 (Colin Shapiro & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1997); see
Masand et al., supra note 30, at 650; Michael S. Moore, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. l'A. 1.
REv. 1749, 1812-13, 1815 (1994); Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L.
REv. 1587, 1641-42 (1994).
" See Adam Candeub, Consciousness and Culpability, 54 M.A. L. REv. 113, 119, 121
(2002); Michael Corrado, Addiction and Causation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 913, 919-20
(2000); Mark E. Hindley, United States V. Denny-Shaffer and Multiple Personality Disorder:
"Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie far?," 1994 UTAH L. REV. 961. 993-94; Bruce Ledewitz,
Mc Carroll's Mental State or What Is Meant by Intent, 39 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 80-81 (2001);
2004]	 The Sleepwalking Defense	 157
is that sleepwalkers are not aware of their actions, and thus, should
not be held culpable for actions beyond their con tro1. 65
 If sleepwalk-
ers are capable of exercising discretion over their actions, the premise
of involuntariness is undermined, and the sleepwalking defense
fails. 66
 The philosophical debate over sleepwalking volition has
identified the following four theories of sleepwalking action: (1) the
Model Penal Code approach, (2) the voluntary act theory, (3) the
dual-self theory, and (4) the semi-voluntary act theory.°
1. Sleepwalking Is Not a Voluntary Act: The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code (the "MPC") adopts a voluntary act re-
quirement, which does not specifically define a voluntary act, but uses
sleepwalking as an example of what is not voluntary.69 Under the
MPC, a voluntary act is an essential component of any crime, and
therefore, any act that is not voluntary is not a crime. 69
Under this theory of sleepwalking, actions of sleepwalkers are not
voluntary because sleepwalkers lack the ability to entertain and re-
solve conflicting interests. 70 Sleepwalkers are not conscious of their
actions. 71
 Even if sleepwalkers are capable of considering and execut-
ing volitional movements, the decision-making process is so impaired
that sleepwalkers cannot effectively restrain their behavior. 72 Thus,
sleepwalkers should not be punished for their behavior because they
did not have the mental or physical capacity to choose any alternate
Moore, supra note 63, at 1809, 1818; Morse, supra note 63, at 1646; Paul H. Robinson, A
Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. L. Rcv. 857, 898-900 (1994); Bernard Williams,
The Actus Reus of Dr. Caligari, 142 U. PA. 1.. REV. 1661, 1664, 1667 (1994).
65
 Fenwick, supra note 32, at 574; see Moore, supra note 63, at 1812-13; Saks, supra note
62, at 434-35.
86 See Candeub, supra note 64, at 121; Corrado, supra note 9, at 1553-54.
87 See infra notes 68-101 and accompanying text.
88 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962) (listing four examples of actions that are
not voluntary, including "a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep"); see also
Denno, supra note 9, at 287-89 (discussing the MPC's failure to define "voluntary" and
"unconsciousness"). Due to a lack of case law addressing various theories of sleepwalking
volition, the following discussion relies primarily on the MPC and legal scholarship. See
Mom. PENAL CODE § 2.01(2); Den no, supra note 9, at 287-89.
69 See MODEL PENAL. CODE § 2.01(2).
78 See Moore, supra note 63, at 1817.
71 See People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 922 (Cal. 1974).
72 See Moore, supra note 63, at 1817.
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course of action, 73 They could not have avoided the allegedly criminal
behavior.74
Furthermore, the theory of sleepwalking as an involuntary act
proposes that sleepwalkers are unable to attend consciously to detailed
behavior and have no memory of their sleepwalking episodes upon
waking. 75 The full range of desires and intentions that are available to
waking persons are not available to the sleepwalker. 76 Accordingly, the
crucial component of volition, the ability to choose between alternate
courses of action, the ability to choose between right and wrong, is not
available to the sleepwalker." This is why sleepwalkers do not act volun-
tarily, and this is why they are incapable of criminal conduct. 78
2. Sleepwalking Is a Voluntary Act
The MPC's classification of sleepwalking as an involuntary act has
been greeted with skepticism. 79 The skeptics propose that sleepwalk-
ing is a voluntary act and criminal acts performed while sleepwalking
are within the sleepwalker's control. 8° Sleepwalkers appear to exhibit
a substantial amount of control over their actions, making their be-
havior seem voluntary and uninhibited. 81 Some sleepwalkers perform
complicated tasks in their sleep and often respond to environmental
stimuli.82 This responsive behavior appears to be goal-oriented, lead-
ing some to believe that sleepwalkers are aware of themselves and the
surrounding environment, and therefore, their bodily movements are
intentional actions. 83 Sleepwalkers respond to their perceptions of the
waking world, and exhibit behavior that is not just patterned after
waking conduct, but interactive with the waking world. 84
7' Smith & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 2; see H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RICSPONSI-
BILITY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY or LAW 109, 153 (1968); Moore, supra note 63, at 1817.
74 See Moore, supra nate 63, at 1817.
75 See id. at 1813.
78 See id. at 1815.
"Smith & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 32; see Moore, supra note 63, at 1817.
78 See Moore, supra note 63, at 1817.
78 See id. at 1809, 1812; Williams, supra note 64, at 1664, 1667.
8" See Candeub, supra note 69, at 121; Corrado, supra note 9, at 1554; Moore, supra
note 63, at 1812, 1813; Williams, supra note 64, at 1664, 1667.
81 See Corrado, supra note 9, at 1553-54; Moore, supra note 63, at 1813.
82 See Corrado, supra note 9, at 1553; Fenwick, supra note 5, at 346; Morse, supra note
63, at 1641. But see Pitmortys At4n PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701
(suggesting that sleepwalkers have a diminished response to environmental stimuli).
63 See Corrado, supra note 9, at 1554; Morse, supra note 63, at 1641, 1646.
64 Set Morse, supra note 63, at 1691, 1696.
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Sleepwalking conduct appears to be volitional, purposeful action,
and without evidence to the contrary, a presumption of intent should
apply to defendants raising the sleepwalking defense. 85 According to
this theory, not only does sleepwalking behavior appear voluntary to
onlookers, the behavior is guided by the intentions of the sleepwalker,
and therefore, is voluntary. 8° Thus, sleepwalking defenses are dubious,
at best, because the criminal conduct was probably a manifestation of
the sleepwalker's in ten L 87 Furthermore, sleepwalking is easily diag-
nosed, and proper treatment can mitigate sleepwalking violence or
even eliminate episodes altogether, which suggests that sleepwalking
violence is preventable."
3. The Dual-Self Theory
The dual-self theory proposes that sleepwalking behavior is voli-
tional but is not criminal because sleepwalkers are not conscious of
their actions." Under this theory, sleepwalkers have some basic level
of comprehension about their actions, but they lack the consciousness
to fully understand the consequences of those actions." The waking
self cannot be held responsible for the actions of the unconscious
sleeping self, and it would be wrong to punish criminal defendants for
actions perpetrated while unconscious. 91 Under this dual-self theory
of sleepwalking, the sleeping self is not governed by the intentions
and volitions of the waking self." Unlike the waking self, the sleeping
self is unconscious of its behavior, and therefore, unable to perpetrate
any criminal act."
In 1974, in People v. Sedeno, the California Supreme Court implic-
itly supported the dual-self theory." The court ruled that under the
California Penal Code, unconscious actors (including sleepwalkers)
e8 See id. at 1651-52.
56 See id.
57 Sec id.
as Karacan, supra note 38, at 133-34; Raschka, supra note 42, at 133-34; Paula K. Rauch
& Theodore A. Stern, Life Threatening Injuries Resulting from Sleepwalking and Night Terra%
27 Psvcitosonu•rtcs 62, 64 (1986) (describing various preventative measures that sleep-
walkers should take to minimize potential harm to themselves and others); Reid et al.,
supra note 31, at 36 (finding a positive response to hypnotherapy among severely som-
nambulistic patients subject to six brief sessions).
all See Candeub, supra note 64, at 117; Saks, supra note 62, at 434-35.
913 See Candeub, supra note 64, at 117; Saks, supra note 62, at 434-35.
51 Saks, supra note 62, at 435.
62 Id.
93 Id.
94 See 518 P.2d at 922; infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
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do not act with volition because they are not aware that they are act-
ing.95 Implicit in the decision was the belief that a sleepwalker's ac-
tions are not controlled by the sleepwalker's conscience, so the sleep-
walker cannot be punished for actions committed while asleep.96
4. The Semi-Voluntary Act Theory
The semi-voluntary act theory asserts that sleepwalking behavior
is neither clearly voluntary, nor clearly involuntary', and either
classification of sleepwalking conduct is premature and unfounded. 97
Adherents to the semi-voluntary act theory believe that the MPC di-
chotomy between voluntary and involuntary conduct is arbitrary and
that there seems to be little medical support for drawing such an ab-
solute distinction. 98 According to this theory, sleepwalking should be
classified as a semi-voluntary act, because it is neither completely vol-
untary, nor completely involuntary. 99 This would allow courts to de-
termine, on an ad hoc basis, which sleepwalking acts are voluntary
and which acts are involuntary. 199 Sleepwalking is not easily classified
as either conscious or unconscious action, leading to the possible
conclusion that the sleepwalker's consciousness should be evaluated
on a sliding scale, which is entirely consistent with the notion of
sleepwalking as a semi-voluntary act. 101
II. HISTORY OF THE SLEEPWALKING DEFENSE
Regardless of whether sleepwalking behavior is voluntary or in-
voluntary, sleepwalking has been raised and accepted as a defense to
criminal culpability in common-law jurisdictions for over three hun-
dred years. 192 The sleepwalking defense is asserted rarely in American
courts, leaving judges and criminal defendants wondering how the
95 See Sedeno, 518 P.2d at 922; see also CAL. PENAL CODE 26(4) (2003).
96 See Sedeno, 518 P.2d at 922; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(4).
97 See Moore, supra note 63, at 1815.
98 See Denim, supra note 9, at 287, 292, 308.
99 See id. at 359, 361.
1 °° See id. at 357, 369, 371-74.
101 Smith & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 59.
102 See Bonkalo, supra note 42, at 401 (tracing the roots of the sleepwalking defense
back as far as 1313 when the Council of Vienne declared that if a sleepwalking person
killed or wounded someone, he was not held culpable); Fenwick, supra note 5, at 351 (In
England, in 1686, a Colonel Culpepper shot a guardsman and his horse on night patrol. At
his trial he pleaded, successfully, that he committed the crime when asleep, and was con-
victed of manslaughter while insane.").
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.defense should be applied. 1 °) Sleepwalking has been raised under
three criminal law defenses: automatism, unconsciousness, and insan-
ity.'" Courts agree that sleepwalking is a defense to criminal conduct,
but they do not agree about how to apply the defense.'°5
A. Somnambulism: Automatism and Unconsciousness
Occasionally, sleepwalkers run afoul of the law, much to the sur-
prise of sleepwalkers, their victims, and the courts who must decide
what to do with these defendants.m Courts have generally classified
sleepwalking, also known as somnambulism, as a defense to criminal
charges under the common-law doctrines of automatism and uncon-
sciousness. 107
 Legal scholars use the term "automatism" to classify
states of involuntary bodily movement, and "unconsciousness" to de-
scribe states of temporary mental incapacity. 108
Criminal justice has long supported the belief that criminal de-
fendants should only be held responsible for actions that could have
been avoided had the defendant simply chosen otherwise. 1 °9 Actors
must have some control over their physical and mental capacities to
be held responsible for criminal wrongdoing.n° Consequently, society
does not punish actions performed in a state of uncontrolled motion
or unconsciousuess.'ll
1°5 See Grant, supra note 8, at 1009.
um See Denno, supra note 9, at 284-85. The recent decision of New fast), u Overton is a de-
parture front the traditional approach to sleepwalking defenses. Sec generally 815 A.2d 517
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). The court held that sleepwalking negates the voluntary act
requirement and implicitly recognized a general sleepwalking defense outside the confines
of the traditional doctrines of automatism, unconsciousness, and insanity. Ia. at 522.
1°5 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The Overton decision further illustrates the
inconsistency atnong courts faced with sleepwalking defenses. See supra notes 9, 104 and
accompanying text.
106 See Denno, supra note 9, at 346-48; Grant, supra note 8, at 1009-11.
107
 People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 922 (Cal. 1974) (classifying sleepwalking as an un-
consciousness defense); McClain v. Indiana, 678 N.E.2d 104, 106-07 (Ind. 1997) (classify-
Mg sleepwalking as an automatism defense); see Denno, supra note 9, at 284-85.
10° See Denno, supra note 9, at 283-84. Unconsciousness is not to he confused with in-
sanity. The unconsciousness defense applies to defendants who claim to have been tempo-
rarily mentally incapacitated at the time of the crime, whereas, the insanity defense applies
to defendants with permanent mental incapacities. McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 108; Denim,
supra note 9, at 283-84.
109 See HART , supra note 73, at 153; Corrado, supra note 9, at 1553.
110 &CHART, supra note 73, at 158; Denno, supra note 9, at 271, 283.
111 See People v. Coogler, 454 P.2d 686, 696 (Cal. 1969).
162	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 46:149
1. Automatism
Sleepwalking, under specific circumstances, has been a complete
defense to criminal culpability under the doctrine of automatism." 2
Automatism is a common-law defense where defendants are released
from criminal culpability upon proving that their actions were the re-
sult of involuntary bodily movement." 3 Automatism relies on the as-
sumption that a sleepwalker's bodily motions are beyond the sleep-
walker's waking control, and the waking self should not be punished
for the misdeeds of the sleeping self.'" In 1950, in the English case of
King v. Cogdon, the defendant was acquitted on charges of murdering
her daughter with an axe. 115 Mrs. Cogdon had been sleepwalking
when she wandered into her daughter's room, and believing that
there were soldiers attacking her daughter, she struck twice with an
axe, killing her daughter." 8 In her defense, Mrs. Cogdon claimed
automatism, more specifically somnambulism, and sought to establish
that her actions were beyond her control. 11 " Her story was supported
by testimony of a physician, a psychiatrist, and a psychologist, who all
believed that she suffered from a series of mental and physical stresses
which made her prone to sleepwalking." 8 The jury believed Mrs.
Cogdon and acquitted; they believed the killing was not an act within
her control. 119
2. Unconsciousness
Sleepwalking also has been classified as an unconsciousness de-
fense.'" Unconsciousness is a common-law defense absolving criminal
defendants of culpability upon proving they were temporarily men-
tally incapacitated at the time of the criminal act. 121 The uncon-
sciousness defense assumes that sleepwalkers are incapable of crimi-
112 See Howard & D'Orban, supra note 6, at 923 (discussing the tendency of British
courts to accept, in principle, the defense of automatism for sleepwalking defendants be-
cause it seems unfair to hold them morally accountable for their actions); Morse, supra
note 63, at 1641; Grant, supra note 8, at 1000, 1004.
115 See McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 106.
1 " Hindley, supra note 64, at 993; Saks, supra note 62, at 434-35.
115 King v. Cogdon (Vitt. 1950) (unreported), discussed in Norval Morris, Somnambulis-




119 Id.; see Denno, supra note 9, at 369-73.
120 See Sedeno, 518 P.2d at 922; Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 189, 193 (1879).
141 See Sedeno, 518 P.2d at 922.
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nal activity because their minds are asleep, and therefore, sleepwalk-
ers do not exhibit the requisite mental capacity to commit a crime. 122
Accordingly, criminal defendants who prove that they performed
their actions while asleep must be acquitted because they were not
capable of conscious thought or criminal intent.'"
In 1879, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Fain v. Common-
wealth reversed the defendant's conviction for manslaughter after
finding that the trial court should have admitted evidence confirming
the defendant's history of sleepwalking. 124 In Fain, Welsh and the de-
fendant fell asleep in the lobby of the Verdana Hotel where Welsh
later woke and tried to wake the defendant. 123 When the defendant
did not stir, Welsh asked a stranger to wake him. 123 The stranger
picked up the defendant, who suddenly pulled a gun and shot the
stranger three times, inflicting lethal wounds. 127 The defendant
claimed that he slept through the entire ordea1. 128 The court held that
evidence of the defendant's history of sleepwalking would have
confirmed that the defendant was unconscious at the time of the
shooting, and therefore, was unable to understand the circumstances
or consequences of his actions. 129 Implicit in the court's reasoning was
the belief that if the defendant could prove that he was sleeping when
he killed the stranger, the unconsciousness defense would apply, and
the defendant would be acquitted. 13°
California has codified the unconsciousness defense and inter-
preted the defense to include sleepwalking."' The California Penal
Code exempts from criminal liability persons who committed an al-
legedly criminal act while unconscious. 132 In 1974, in People v. Sedeno,
the Supreme Court of California found the Penal Code's definition of
122 Sec Hindley, supra note 64, at 993-94; see also Louise Harmon, Wild Dimmers: Medita-
tions on the Admissibility of Dreant Talk, 79 WASII. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (2004) (stating that
"[t]he law belongs to the waking world, not to the world of sleep; it presupposes con-
sciousness, social interaction, verticality") ,
125 See Hindley, supra note 64, at 993-94; see also Overton, 815 A.2d at 522 (holding that
sleepwalking negates the voluntary act requirement, but leaving open the possibility that
sleepwalking behavior may be reckless when the sleepwalker is aware of the condition and
fails to take adequate preventative measures).
124 78 Ky. at 189, 193.
125 Id. at 184.
125 Id.
127 Id. at 185.
'" See id. at 186, 189.
129 Fain, 78 Ky. at 186, 189.
15° Id.
"'CAL. PENAL ConE § 26(4) (2003); Scdeno, 518 P.2d at 922.
152 CAL. PENAL Com: § 26(4).
164	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 46:149
unconsciousness to include acts performed while sleepwalking. 133
 The
court reasoned that an unconscious act is one committed by a person
whose act cannot be deemed volitional due to sleepwalking, a blow to
the head, or a similar cause.134 The defendant, charged with first de-
gree murder, was struck in the head during a fatal fight with his
prison guard. 133
 The defendant claimed that the blow to his head
rendered him unconscious for the duration of the fight, so he re-
quested an unconsciousness defense. 136 Criminal defendants who wish
to raise the sleepwalking defense in California must assert the defense
of unconsciousness, which, if proven, results in acquittal.'"
The distinction between unconsciousness and automatism has
faded, and because the defenses are functionally equivalent, sleep-
walking could be raised under both doctrines. 158 Automatism and un-
consciousness remain the predominant defenses to criminal culpabil-
ity, and in some jurisdictions, remain the only recognized defenses for
sleepwalking defendan ts."9
B. Sleepwalking and Insanity
The only other recognized defense for criminal acts perpetrated
while sleepwalking is legal insanity." ) The insanity defense applies
when the defendant has a mental disease or defect, which renders the
defendant incapable of cognitive awareness and control at the time of
the criminal conduct. 141 Most jurisdictions have distinguished a sleep-
walking defense from an insanity defense, and few courts continue to
133 518 P.2d at 922.
134 See Sedeno, 518 P.2d at 922; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(4).
133 Sedeno, 518 P.2d at 917.
136
 Id. at 922.
137 See id.
133 See Michael Corrado, Automatism and the Theory of Action, 39 EMORY L.J. 1191, 1217
(1990); Benno, supra note 9, at 338.
139
 See Sedeno, 518 P.2d at 922.
140 See Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 128 S.W. 871, 874 (Ky. 1910).
141 Patricia J. Faulk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the Social
Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV, 731, 784
(1996). An alternative analysis requires the following three components: (1) mental disease
or defect, (2) lack of cognition, and (3) lack of volition. See Grant, supra note 8, at 1004.
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recognize sleepwalking as an insanity defense. 142 A minority of courts,
however, have treated sleepwalking as an insanity defense." 3
Some courts have instructed juries on the insanity defense when
defendants asserted a sleepwalking defense.'" In 1910, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky in Tibbs v. Commonwealth affirmed the trial court's
decision to instruct the jury on the insanity defense, rather than a
separate sleepwalking defense." 5 In Tibbs, the defendant left a "house
of ill fame" and fell asleep after consuming alcohol." 6
 The defen-
dant's friend tried to wake defendant causing defendant to punch
him. 1 g7
 Immediately after punching his friend, the defendant apolo-
gized and shook hands with his friend, but later stabbed his friend
above the eye, inflicting fatal wounds. 148 The defendant claimed that
he was sleepwalking throughout the entire incident and that he re-
membered nothing of the encOunter. 149 The court declared that even
if the defendant was sleepwalking, the only defense appropriate for
that claim was insanity. 150
Similarly, in 1925, in Bradley v. State, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals of Texas reversed the defendant's conviction for murder, hold-
ing that the trial court should have applied the insanity defense to the
defendant, who claimed that he was sleepwalking during the inci-
dent. 151 In Bradley, the defendant put a pistol under his pillow before
falling asleep, rose when he heard a noise, and fired several shots, kill-
ing Ada Jenkins in his bed. 152
 His conviction was reversed partially on
the grounds that the trial court failed to consider his claim that he
was sleepwalking at the time of the shooting. 153 The court stated that
142 See Denno, supra note 9, at 342-48. The reluctance of courts to accept insanity de-
fenses for sleepwalking defendants might be attributed to the tenuous link between medi-
cal definitions of insanity and attempts to classify sleepwalking under the legal definition
of insanity. See Howard & D'Orbhn, supra note 6, at 924.
145 See Michael J. Davidson & Steve Walters, United States v. Berri: The Automatism De-
fense Rears Its Ugly Head, 1993 ARMY LAW. 17, 19; Demi°, supra note 9, at 284, 343-44, 346-
48; Grant, supra note 8, at 1003.
144 see, e.g. , Tibbs, 128 S.W. at 874; Bradley v. State, 277 S.W. 147, 149 (Tex. Grins. App.
1925).
145
 See 128 S.W. at 874.
"a Id. at 872.
147 Id.
"a Id.
149 Id. at 873, 874.
laa See Tibbs, 128 S.W. at 874 ("We fail to see how these facts would constitute any de-
fense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity").
277 S.W. at 149, 150.
107 Id. at 148.
105 .1d. at 149, 150.
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the sleepwalking defense should take the form of an insanity defense,
which results in acquittal if believed by the jury.'" The court in Bradley
considered sleepwalking to be the legal equivalent of insanity. 155
In contrast, some courts distinguish sleepwalking from insanity
defenses. 156 In 1997, in McClain. v. Indiana, the Supreme Court of Indi-
ana, faced with no binding precedent, held that sleepwalking cannot be
raised as an insanity defense. 157 The court held that automatism, in-
cluding sleepwalking, was a matter of voluntary action, not a matter of
mental defect, and therefore, the automatism defense should be dis-
tinct from the defense of legal insanity.'" The court reasoned that the
difference between insanity and automatism/unconsciousness is the
potential punishment. 159 Criminally insane defendants are considered
mentally impaired and may be committed to a mental institution,
whereas defendants raising the automatism/unconsciousness defense
do not stiffer from any long-term mental deficiencies and would not
benefit from institutionalization. 16° Requiring the institutionalization of
sleepwalkers would result in the commitment of defendants who are
entirely sane and who do not suffer from any mental defects. 161 Conse-
quently, the court ruled that the defense of automatism, which includes
the defense of sleepwalking in Indiana, is separate from the defense of
insanity.162
Few courts continue to recognize sleepwalking as an insanity de-
fense and there is little precedent on which a court could justify such a
classification.163 Modern courts and scholars have abandoned the
classification of sleepwalking as an insanity defense, primarily because
criminally insane defendants are often committed to a mental institu-
tion for mental rehabilitation, an inappropriate treatment for sleep-
walkers.'" Criminally insane defendants are considered to have a per-
manent or semi-permanent mental incapacity, making rehabilitation
and institutionalization appropriate remedies, 165 Conversely, sleepwalk-
154 Id. at 149.
155 See id.
156 See, e.g., McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 107.
157 Id.
'58 See id. at 106-07.
159 See id. at 108-09.
165 See id. at 109; Grant, supra note 8, at 1004-05.
161 See McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 109.
152 See id. at 107.
I" See id.
154 See Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142,145 (Wy. 1981); Grant, supra note 8, at 1004-05.
"5 See Grant, supra note 8, at 1004.
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ing defendants do not suffer from any permanent mental disorders and
receive no benefit from rehabilitative treatment. 166
Sleepwalkers resemble the criminally insane in appearance only;
the psychological and physiological causes of sleepwalking differ sub-
stantially from the causes of insanity. 167 The classification of sleepwalk-
ing as an insanity defense was based on the assumption that sleep-
walkers suffered from a mental disease similar to insanity, as seen in
Bradley.m8 Recent medical research suggests that sleepwalking is not a
psychological disorder, but a physiological phenomenon triggered by
a combination of genetic and environmental factors. 169
III. SLEEPWALKING ON TRIAL: THE BURDEN OF PROVING SLEEPWALKING
If a court chooses to recognize a defense based on sleepwalking,
either through the automatism or unconsciousness defenses or
through legal insanity, it must decide which party should bear the
burden of proving whether sleepwalking occurred at the time of the
allegedly criminal act.'" Common-law decisions indicate that courts
have reached different decisions on who should bear the burden of
proof in cases where defendants were allegedly sleepwalking."'
A. Defendant's Burden: The Affirmative Defense
Some courts require the defendant to raise sleepwalking as an
affirmative defense.'" This requires defendants to prove that they
were sleepwalking at the time of the criminal acts in question.'" The
affirmative defense of sleepwalking is a complete defense resulting in
acquittal. 174
In 1879, in Fain v, Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky found reversible error in the trial court's failure to admit evi-
166 See Fuleher, 633 P.2d at 146; Grant, supra note 8, at 1004.
167 See Fuleher, 633 P.2d at 145; Grant, supra note 8, at 1004; supra notes 33-35 and ac-
companying text.
168 Oswald & Evans, supra note 26, at 690; see 277 S.W. at 149.
169 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
17° See Morse, supra note 63, at 1641, 1651.
171 See Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 188 (1879) (implicitly placing burden of
proof on the defendant through an affirmative defense); Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142,
147 (Wy. 1981) (suggesting that the burden of proof lies with the prosecution if the facts
suggest the defendant may have lost consciousness or control of his actions during the
crime).
172 See Corrado, supra note 9, at 1554; Morse, supra note 63, at 1651.
173 See Morse, supra note 63, at 1651-52.
174 See Grant, supra note 8, at 1000.
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dence in support of the defendant's claim that he was sleepwalking
when he shot a stranger who tried to wake him. 175 The court implicitly
found that the defendant needed an opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumption that he was awake during the shooting, which if such evi-
dence were admitted, would have served as an affirmative defense to
the shooting."8
In 1943, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Lewis v. Stale found
that the sleepwalking defense did not apply because the defendant
failed to offer evidence in support of his claim that he suffered from
sleepwalking at the time of the shooting. 177 In Lewis, the defendant
laid his pistol on the mantle before falling asleep and woke the next
morning to find his friend in the bed next to him, lying dead from
bullet wounds. 178 The defendant did not remember anything of the
previous night's events and asserted a defense of sleepwalking. 179 The
court's reasoning implied that the defendant, if anyone, was responsi-
ble for raising the issue of sleepwalking, and he must offer some evi-
dence in support of his claim.m
In both Fain and Lewis the courts made an a priori assumption
that shootings generally occur while the shooter is awake.un Based on
the evidence presented in these cases, an inference of sleepwalking
does not arise from the facts, and therefore, any effort to prove that
the defendant was sleepwalking should fall on the defendant." 32 If the
fact pattern suggests that sleepwalking was a possibility at the time of
the alleged crime, then the defendant needs an opportunity to pres-
ent that defense to the jury. 183
Supporters of the affirmative defense to sleepwalking suggest
several advantages. 184 Defendants have the best access to the necessary
evidence of sleepwalking, such as past instances of sleepwalking and
testimony from family members and loved ones of sleepwalking ten-
178 78 Ky. at 185, 189 (the defendant sought to offer evidence that he had been a
sleepwalker since childhood); see supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
t 76 See Fain, 78 Ky. at 189.
177 27 S.E.2d 659, 665-66 (Ga. 1943) (finding the sleepwalking defense inapplicable in
this case). Sleepwalking is a recognized defense to criminal charges. See id.: State v. Wil-
liams, 252 S.E.2d 739, 744 (N.C. 1979) (citing generally Lewis).
178 27 S.E.2d at 659.
179 Id.
187 See id.
181 See Lewis, 27 S.E.2d at 665; Fain, 78 Ky. at 189.
182 See Lewis, 27 S.E.2d at 665-66.
153 See Lewis, 27 S.E.2d at 665; Fain, 78 Ky. at 189.
1 s4 See Morse, supra note 63, at 1651-52.
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dencies.I 85 Furthermore, affirmative defense advocates believe that
defendants should carry the burden of proof because they are the
ones aware of their state of consciousness at the time of the acts in
question. 188
 The affirmative defense approach assumes that most ac-
tions are voluntary and that to prove otherwise, a defendant must
show a lack of substantial control at the time of the act.' 87
 According
to affirmative defense advocates, claims of sleepwalking are too
difficult to refute and too easy to fake, and therefore, the burden of
proof should remain with the defendant.I 88
B. The Voluntary Act: The Prosecution's Burden
Some jurisdictions have left open the possibility of placing the
burden of proof on the prosecution to establish that the defendant
was not sleepwalking. 189
 Under this approach, the prosecution would
have to disprove the defendant's claim of sleepwalking.'"
The MPC implicitly supports placing the burden of proof on the
prosecution through the voluntary act requirement."' The MPC re-
quires proof of a voluntary act for criminal culpability and defines
sleepwalking as a non-voluntary act.I 92 A voluntary act is an essential
element of any crime, and sleepwalking defendants would be acquitted
if the jury believed that they were sleepwalking at the time of the act.'"
According to this argument, volition is the primary concern, so sleep-
walkers, who are incapable of voluntary actions as a matter of law, are
incapable of committing criminal acts.t 94
 If sleepwalkers are not re-
sponsible for their actions, they need not excuse their conduct. 195
In 1981, in hitcher v. State, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held
that the unconsciousness/automatism defense is separate from the
defense of insanity, and the burden of establishing automatism/un-
185 See Masand et al., supra note 30, at 652; Morse, supra note 63, at 1652.
'88 See Grant, supra note 8, at 1002.
187 See Denno, supra note 9, at 271; Ledewitz, supra note 64, at 102-03.
188
 Morse, supra note 63, at 1651-52.
189 See, e.g., State v. Connell, 493 S.E.2d 292, 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Fulcher, 633 P.2d
at 147; Grant, supra note 8, at 1002.
19° See Connell, 493 S.E.2d at 296; Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 147; Grant, supra note 8, at 1002,
' 81 See MODEL. PENA I. CODE § 2.01 (1962); Corrado, supra note 9, at 1554; Ledewitz, su-
pra note 64, at 80-81.
192 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01.
195 See id.; McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 109, 107-08 (Ind. 1997); Corrado, supra note 9,
at 1554; Denno, supra note 9, at 271, 284-85; Ledewitz, supra note 64, at 80-81.
194
 Corrado, supra note 9, at 1554; see Denno, supra note 9, at 275-76; Ledewitz, supra
note 64, at 80-81.
198
 John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 Bun. Clam. L. Ray. 575, 589 (1998).
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consciousness rests upon the defendant, unless it arises from the
prosecution's evidence.' 96 The court provided sleepwalking as an ex-
ample of when an automatism/unconsciousness instruction should
apply.' 97
 The language of the hitcher opinion is ambiguous, and it
could be interpreted to suggest that the burden of proof may shift to
the prosecution if, and only if, evidence presented by the prosecution
would lead the fact finder to believe that the defendant perpetrated
the allegedly criminal act while sleepwalking.m
Subsequently, in 1997, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in
State v. Connell ordered a new trial of the defendant accused of sexual
assault of a minor, in part because the trial court failed to instruct the
jury with an unconsciousness defense. 199 The facts showed that the
defendant went to bed and fell asleep, soon to be joined by his girl-
friend and her daughter."° The defendant was accused of sexually
molesting his girlfriend's daughter during the night. 201 He claimed
that even if he did commit the acts in question, he was asleep at the
time.202
 The court set forth an ambiguous opinion, faulting the prose-
cution for failing to provide any evidence that the defendant was
awake, while simultaneously affirming the defendant's duty to raise
sleepwalking as an affirmative defense. 203
 The court noted the lack of
judicial precedent as to who should bear the burden of proving
sleepwalking behavior. 204 Like Fulcher, where the court relied on the
same interpretation of the unconsciousness defense, one possible in-
terpretation of the Connell court's decision is that the burden of dis-
proving the defendant's sleepwalking shifts to the prosecution if the
prosecution presents evidence suggesting that the defendant may
have been asleep. 205
199 633 P.2d at 147.
197 Sce id. app. at 147.
199 See id. at 147 ("`We now hold that, under the law of this state, unconsciousness, or
automatism ... is an affirmative defense; and that the burden rests upon the defendant to establish
this defense, unless it arises out of the State's own evidence, to the satisfaction of the jury.'" (quot-
ing State v. Caddell, 215 S.E.2d 348, 363 (N.C. 1975))); see also Connell, 493 S.E.2d at 296.
199 493 S.E.2d at 296, 297.
299 Id. at 294.
2* 1 Id.
202 Id.
293 See id. at 296.
20' Connell, 493 S.E.2d at 296 ("Although our research discloses no case law as to
whether being asleep is an appropriate circumstance that requires an unconsciousness or
diminished capacity instruction, we conclude that on this record both instructions would
be proper.").
205 See id. at 294-95 (stating that 'there was no evidence presented to suggest that the
defendant was awake at the time of the alleged incident"); Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 147; see also
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IV. A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE SLEEPWALKING DEFENSE
Sleepwalking should be recognized as a defense to criminal
charges.206 Current sleepwalking defenses do not account for the
available medical information on sleepwalking. 207 The insanity de-
fense rests on the false presumption that sleepwalking is a mental de-
fect. 208
 Criminal defendants who wish to raise a defense of sleepwalk-
ing find themselves at the mercy of the courts, which have failed to
apply the sleepwalking defense consistently.209
 These inconsistencies
are further exacerbated by the scarcity of judicial opinions addressing
the legal analysis of sleepwalking defenses. 21 ° Courts need to apply the
defense consistently using objective criteria to evaluate the defen-
dant's claim of sleepwalking.211 This Note advocates a distinct,
affirmative defense of sleepwalking to accommodate the unique men-
tal and physical characteristics of sleepwalking.212
A. Problems with Current Sleepwalking Defenses
The preceding review of case law exposes inconsistencies in the
application of the sleepwalking defense. 213 Courts have classified
sleepwalking defenses as unconsciousness, automatism, or insanity. 214
Some courts allow sleepwalking as an affirmative defense whereas
New Jersey v. Overton, 815 A.2d 517, 522 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (stating that once
a defendant raises a question of his or her mental state the prosecution must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted consciously, purposely, and know-
ingly).
206 See Overton, 815 A.2d at 522; Broughton et al., supra note 6, at 263 (laying to rest any
worries that sleepwalking defenses might be abused). Sleepwalking defenses have been
available for over one hundred years and the defense has been used sparingly. See Brough-
ton et al., supra note 6, at 263. Furthermore, it would be extremely difficult for a defendant
to fake the genetic history and medical evidence necessary to establish a persuasive sleep-
walking defense. See id.
207 Smith & Shapiro, supra note 59, at 33; see Fenwick, supra note 8, at 979-80; see also
Howard & D'OrbSn, supra note 6, at 925 (chastising courts for their failure to consider the
medical realities of sleepwalking, and recommending that courts faced with the sleepwalk-
ing defense "should not exploit medical terminology in a manner which, as things stand,
does no justice to medical thinking"); supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text (reviewing
medical information on sleepwalking).
208 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
210 See Smith & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 33.
211 See Den no, supra note 9, at 357.
212 See infra notes 256-319 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 102-205 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 102-169 and accompanying text.
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other courts place the burden of proof on the prosecution.215 Incon-
sistent application of the sleepwalking defense prejudices criminal
defendants who rely on judicial precedent and leaves judges wonder-
ing how to instruct juries on the sleepwalking defense. 216
 Much de-
pends on the resolution of the essential question—who should bear
the burden of proof at a criminal trial when sleepwalking is raised as a
defense?217 Criminal defendants raising the sleepwalking defense have
their freedom at stake and are greatly concerned with consistent ap-
plication of the defense. 218
 Existing defenses purporting to protect
sleepwalking defendants are not sufficiently adapted to the medical
information available on the causes and effects of sleepwalking. 219
1. Sleepwalking Is Neither Automatism Nor Unconsciousness
Sleepwalking is a peculiar and distinct medical phenomenon,
and medical information on sleepwalking does not support the cur-
rent practice of lumping sleepwalking in with the automatism and un-
consciousness defenses. 2" Classifying sleepwalking as automatism or
unconsciousness oversimplifies the issue. 221 Unconsciousness is a state
of temporary mental incapacity; automatism is a state of involuntary
bodily movement.222 Both the automatism and unconsciousness de-
fenses are based on a premise of involuntary action and thought,
which is not supported by medical evidence on sleepwalking. 223
Sleepwalking is not exactly automatism because the sleepwalker's
bodily movements are not clearly involuntary. 224 First, sleepwalkers are
solely responsible for their physical movements; their movements are
directed by their own actions, not some external impetus. 225 Second,
based on the medical and psychological evidence of sleepwalking, the
sleepwalker's actions may be partially voluntary. 226 Sleep researchers
215 See supra notes 170-205 and accompanying text.
218 Sec Denno, supra note 9, at 284-85.
217 See Grant, supra note 8, at 1002.
218 See McClain v. Indiana, 678 N.E.2d 104,109 (Ind. 1997); Denno, supra note 9, at
289-85.
219 See Smith & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 33; supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
229 Smith & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 33; see supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
221 Smith & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 33; see Corrado, supra note 9, at 1553; Fenwick,
supra note 32, at 575.
222 SCC MIMI. notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
2255
	 & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 33; see supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
224 See Smith & Shapiro, supra note 59, at 32; supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
225 See Corrado, supra note 9, at 1553-54; Morse, supra note 63, at 1696.
226 Smith & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 32; see supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
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disagree about whether sleepwalking is automatism and, therefore,
the legal classification of sleepwalking as a form of automatism lacks a
consistent medical basis. 227
Furthermore, sleepwalking is not unconsciousness because the
sleepwalker is not temporarily mentally incapacitated. 228 Sleep re-
search suggests that sleepwalking is a physiological condition of the
body, not a psychological condition of the mind.229 Sleepwalkers do
not suffer from mental incapacity or psychological disorders, and
consequently, they have no temporary mental incapacitation.230
The medical information available on sleepwalking suggests that
many factors contribute to sleepwalking behavior. 2" People prone to
sleepwalking can reduce or even eliminate sleepwalking episodes
though simple lifestyle changes, such as reduced alcohol and drug con-
sumption, regular sleeping schedules, and stress reduction. 232
 Research
suggests that sleepwalkers have the ability to mitigate sleepwalking vio-
lence.2" This suggests that sleepwalking is not completely beyond the
sleepwalker's control as unconsciousness or automatism would suggest,
but rather it is preventable and Curable." 4
Rather than considering the factors contributing to sleepwalking,
courts have been more comfortable treating sleepwalking as a defense
based on involuntary mental incapacity (unconsciousness) or physical
incapacity (automatism). 235
 Automatism and unconsciousness do not
adequately describe the defense of sleepwalking, and they reduce
sleepwalking to a simple physical or mental disorder, when in fact
sleepwalking is a combination of physical, genetic, and environmental
222 See Masand et al., supra note 30, at 650.
228 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note
supra note 33, at 457; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 420.
229
 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; see Gilmore,
supra note 33, at 457; Howard & D'Orban, supra note 6, at 922; Mallow' ald et al., supra note
32, at 420.
230 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; see Gilmore,
supra note 33, at 457; Howard & D'Orb5n, supra note 6, at 922; Maim wald et al., supra note
32, at 420.
231
 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; sec Mahowald
et al., supra note 32, at 420, 426; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 650-52
232
 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30. at 701; sec Gilmore,
supra note 33, at 457-58.
233
 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; sec Gilmore,
supra note 33, at 457-58.
234
 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; see Gilmore,
supra note 33, at 457-58.
"5 See supra notes 102-139 and accompanying text.
30, at 701; see Gilmore,
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conditions that lead the sleepwalker to commit acts of violence. 236 If
sleepwalking can be justified as a defense to criminal culpability it is
not because the sleepwalker suffers from a simple mental or physical
incapacity. 237
2. Sleepwalking Is Not Insanity
The defense of insanity is not a proper means of evaluating a
sleepwalking defense. 238 Under the insanity defense, defendants gen-
erally must prove that they suffered from a mental defect or disor-
der. 239 Sleepwalking is not a mental disorder, and therefore, the de-
fense of insanity is rendered useless because sleepwalking does not
result from a mental disease or defect. 24°
Insanity was thought to be a proper sleepwalking defense at a
time when sleepwalking was viewed as a type of insanity. 241 Sleepwalk-
ing has not been raised successfully as a defense of insanity since the
1925 case of Bradley v. State, when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
based its ruling on outdated medical information on sleepwalking. 242
The court reasoned implicitly that if modern science (as of 1925)
characterized sleepwalking as a form of insanity, then the law might as
well do the same. 243 The court reversed the defendant's conviction
because the trial court should have allowed the defendant to present
his defense of sleepwalking through an insanity defense. 244
More recently, in 1997, in McClain v. Indiana, the Indiana Su-
preme Court ruled that insanity was a separate defense from sleep-
walking and automatism. 245 The court reasoned that policies behind
the insanity defense counsel against classifying automatism as a men-
tal disease or defect. 246 The court was concerned about the fairness of
punishing automatist defendants and attempts to correct their behav-
ior. 247 Defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity are confined
238 See supra notes 220-234 and accompanying text.
" 7 See supra notes 220-234 and accompanying text.
238 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 980; see supra notes 30-35, 156-169 and accompanying
text.
239 See Grant, supra note 8, at 1004.
240 See McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 108-09; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 457.
241 See Bradley v. State, 277 S.W. 147, 149 (Tax. Grim. App. 1925).
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 See id. at 149, 150,
243 678 N.E.2d at 108.
248 See id. at 108-09.
247 See id.
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to mental institutions to correct their mental defects and to mitigate
further harm to themselves and others. 218 The policy of correcting a
defendant's mental defect clearly does not apply to defendants who
commit sleepwalking violence. 249
 Sleepwalkers are not insane, and
consequently, mental institutions cannot correct a defect that does
not exist. 25° By rejecting the insanity defense in cases where the de-
fendant raises sleepwalking as a defense, the McClain court recog-
nized that sleepwalking is substantially different from insanity, and the
two defenses should remain separate. 25 i Following the lead of
McClain, other jurisdictions should not recognize sleepwalking as an
insanity defense. 252
Traditional and modern doctrines of sleepwalking are ill-adapted
to trying defendants who raise the sleepwalking defense.255 Case law
and legal scholarship provide no consistent formula for evaluating
sleepwalking defenses. 254 Sleepwalking is a unique medical condition,
and the defenses of unconsciousness, automatism, and insanity are
not equipped to handle the defense of sleepwalking.255
B. Proposed Resolution
Because existing defenses are ill-equipped to handle sleepwalking
defenses, sleepwalking should be a separate, affirmative defense with
the burden of proof on the defendant. 256
 The defense should apply
when either the defense or the prosecution offers evidence suggesting
that the defendant may have been asleep at the time of the alleged
crime. 257
 Defendants should be given an opportunity to prove that
they were sleepwalking at the time of the crime and that the sleep-
walking was sufficiently debilitating to render them incapable of
committing criminal acts.258
 A distinct affirmative defense for sleep-
walking would provide courts with a consistent, scientific, and specific
248 Fenwick, supra note 8. at 980; see McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 109.
246 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 980; Fenwick, supra note 32, at 575; see McClain, 678
N.E.2d at 109.
256
 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 980; Fenwick, supra note 32, at 575; see Grant, supra note 8,
at 1004-05.
251 See McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 108.
252
 See id.
253 See supra notes 213-252 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 213-252 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 213-252 and accompanying text.
256 See Smith & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 33; Morse, supra note 63, at 1651-52.
257 Sec Overton, 815 A.2d at 522; Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142,147 (Wy. 1981).
258 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 355.
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formula for determining criminal culpability.259
 Criminal defendants
would no longer have to guess whether sleepwalking could be admit-
ted as an unconsciousness defense, an automatism defense, an insan-
ity defense, or rejected altogether. 26° Courts should evaluate, on a
case-by-case basis, the credibility of the defendant's sleepwalking claim
according to a reliable, objective set of criteria based on empirical
medical research. 261
1. Incorporation of Medical Evidence on Sleepwalking
Current legal doctrines of sleepwalking do not adequately ad-
dress what sleepwalking is, how it works, and how it affects the sleep-
walker's body and mind.262 In Fain v. Commonwealth, the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky declared that the law must acknowledge the
medical phenomenon of sleepwalking and offer the defendant an
opportunity to present the defense. 263
 Implicit in the decision is the
belief that the law should respond to medical information on sleep-
walking to determine the defendant's criminal culpability. 284
Sleepwalking defenses should be evaluated using objective crite-
ria consistent with the medical information available on sleepwalk-
ing. 265
 Sleepwalking research has identified several trigger factors con-
tributing to the ousel of sleepwalking episodes. 266 These factors
include the following: drug and alcohol use, irregular sleep patterns
or sleep deprivation, and environmental stresses.267 Courts should use
this information to evaluate the credibility of defendants claiming
that they were sleepwalking at the time of the alleged crimes. 288
259 See Denno, supra note 9, at 357.
260 See id. at 284-85. Defendants may also fear that expert testimony on sleepwalking
might be excluded altogether. Sec People v. Cegers, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2c1 297, 298 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
261 Sec Denno, supra note 9, at 357. This proposal is implicitly supported in a thorough
analysis of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada affirming the acquittal of
Kenneth Parks, who drove to the home of his parents-in-law while sleepwalking, and as-
saulted his father-in-law and killed his mother-in-law. See Broughton et al., supra note 206, at
254-60.
262 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 355.
269 78 Ky. 183, 188 (1879).
261 See id. at 188.
265 See PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 704; Fenwick,
supra note 5, at 353-55.
266 Fenwick, supra note 5, at 347, 350, 354; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 420, 423;
Masand et al., supra note 30, at 652.
267 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 347, 350, 354; Mahowald et al„ supra note 32, at 420,,
423; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 652.
266 See Overton, 815 A.2d at 520; Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55.
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Furthermore, sleep experts have identified medical conditions
that are commonly associated with sleepwalking. 269 Sleepwalking typi-
cally occurs within the first two or three hours of sleep. 270 A family his-
tory of sleepwalking raises the likelihood that the defendant suffers
from sleepwalking.271
 Past instances of sleepwalking suggest a predispo-
sition to sleepwalking. 272 SleepWalking rarely begins after childhood, 273
and children are more likely to sleepwalk than adults. 274 In the absence
of these conditions, a defendant's claim of sleepwalking at the time of
the act should be doubted. 275
 Proof of these conditions would bolster a
claim that the defendant was sleepwalking at the time of the act. 27°
2. The New Sleepwalking Defense
The sleepwalking defense should be a multi-factored balancing
test setting forth specific criteria, which if proven, would result in ac-
quitta1. 277 Judges should instruct juries on the sleepwalking defense,
and juries should be left to determine whether, based on the medical
and circumstantial evidence presented at trial and the guidelines of the
defense, the defendant was sleepwalking during the alleged crime. 278 If
the jury determines that the defendant was sleepwalking, it. should ac-
quit.279
 An effective and consistent sleepwalking defense should evalu-
ate specific medical and circumstantial criteria in determining whether
the defendant was sleepwalking. 280
 The following discussion proposes
289 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE or SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701, 704; see Fen-
wick, supra note 5, at 353-55.
270 Fenwick, supra note 5, at 346, 354; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455.
271
 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE of SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 700; see Fenwick,
Supra note 5, at 346, 354; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at
420; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 650-51.
272 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
278 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Fenwick, supra
note 5, at 354; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 649-50.
274 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEW!. MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Gilmore, supra
note 33, at 455; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 420; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 649;
Schenck et al., supra note 29, at 1170.
279 Sec Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.




 Sec id.; Howard & D'Orban, supra note 6, at 923 ("Running through many judicial
decisions [in Britain] is a recognition that there are cases of automatism in which it seems
unfair to impute moral responsibility and unnecessary to impose restriction.").
280 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55.
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criteria for courts to consider in evaluating a defendant's claim of
sleepwalking. 281
a. Evidence of Sleepwalking at the Time of the Crime
In evaluating evidence of possible sleepwalking at the time of the
crime courts should compare the nature of the criminal act with the
degree of control exhibited by the defendant. 282 The nature of the
criminal act affects the credibility of the defendant's claim of sleep-
walking in proportion to the complexity of the crime. 283 Some crimes
require more complex actions than others. 284 Violent crimes involving
simple motions are more likely to occur during sleepwalking than
crimes that require planning and intricate thought. 28  For example,
sleepwalking is a much more persuasive defense to assault and battery
than it is to shoplifting. 286 The degree of control exhibited by the de-
fendant is also relevant to the credibility of the sleepwalking claim, 287
For example, a defendant who tied his friend to a chair and abused
him over the course of several hours was probably not sleepwalking,
but if he pushed his friend down the stairs, his claim of sleepwalking
would be more credible. 288 The nature of the crime should be com-
pared with the degree of control exhibited by the sleepwalker to de-
termine if, based on the comparison, the resulting behavior took
place while the defendant was asleep. 289
b. Elapsed Time
Sleepwalking usually occurs within the first two or three hours of
sleep.29° The time when the defendant fell asleep should be consid-
281 See infra notes 282-307 and accompanying text.
282 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426; Oswald
& Evans, supra note 26, at 691.
282 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 652; Oswald &
Evans, supra note 26, at 691.
284 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426; Oswald
& Evans, supra note 26, at 691.
288 See Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 652.
288 See Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426; Oswald & Evans, supra note 26, at 691.
287 See Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426; Oswald & Evans, supra note 26, at 691.
288 See Oswald Sc Evans, supra note 26, at 691.
289 See Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426; Oswald & Evans, supra note 26, at 691.
29° PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE or SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Abe & Shima-
kawa, supra note 32, at 306; Fenwick, supra note 32, at 574; Grant, supra note 8, at 1007;
Hartmann, supra note 32, at 121; Kales et al., supra note 32 at 1407; see Fenwick, supra note
5, at 346; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
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ered to determine if the crime took place within the three hour win-
dow.29' If a crime occurs more than two hours after the defendant. fell
asleep, the defendant's claim of sleepwalking becomes less credible. 292
c. Predisposition to Sleepwalking
A defendant's history of sleepwalking, genetics, and age should be
taken into account when evaluating sleepwalking defenses. 293
 Sleep-
walking generally does not occur in isolated incidences; 294
 a history of
the defendant's sleepwalking episodes will help determine if the de-
fendant was sleepwalking during the crime. 295 Family members,
spouses, and friends are often available to testify about the defendant's
sleeping habits. 295
 A family history of sleepwalking increases the likeli-
hood that the defendant is genetically prone to sleepwalking and
should be considered by the court. 297 The age of the defendant is also
relevant;298
 sleepwalking is much more common in children than adults
and rarely begins after childhood. 299
 For example, a middle-aged de-
fendant with no prior instances of sleepwalking and no family history of
sleepwalking is not likely to succeed on a sleepwalking defense. 599
d. nigger Factors
Ingestion of drugs, alcohol, and medication can trigger sleep-
walking episodes.5911 Allegations of sleepwalking become more credi-
ble when defendants can prove that they ingested any of these sub-
291 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455.
202 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455.
290 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426; Masand
et al., supra note 30, at 651-52.
294 Sec Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
29$ Sec Masand et al., supra note 30, at 652.
296
 Sec Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 425; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 652.
297 Fenwick, supra note 5, at 346, 353-55; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455; Mahowald et
al., supra note 32, at 420; Masand et al., supra note 63, at 650-51.
298 See PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Abe &
Shimakawa, supra note 32, at 308; Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354; Gilmore, supra note 33, at
455; Kales et al., supra note 32, at 1408; Karacan, supra note 38, at 132; Masand et al., supra
note 63, at 649-50.
2°9
 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OP SLEEP MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 701; Abe & Shima-
kawa, supra note 32, at 308; Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455;
Kates et al., supra note 32, at 1408; Karacan, supra note 38, at 132; Masand et al., supra note
63, at 649-50; Reid et al., supra note 31, at 28; Schenck et al., supra note 29, at 1170.
3°° See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354-55; Oswald & Evans, supra note 26, at 691.
3°' See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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stances prior to the alleged crime." 2 Irregular sleep patterns, sleep
deprivation, and stress are also probative of sleepwalking." 3
e. Circumstantial Evidence
Courts should also consider any other relevant information
which tends to support or refute the defendant's claim of sleepwalk-
ing.904 Motive and premeditation decrease the likelihood that the de-
fendant was sleepwalking." 5 Because sleepwalking behavior is usually
impulsive and senseless, the act of sleepwalking violence should seem
random, and there should be no signs of premeditation." 6 Victims of
sleepwalking violence tend to be those who aroused the sleepwalker
or who just happened to be nearby at the wrong time." 7
3. The Balancing Test
All five of the following factors should be considered in determin-
ing the credibility of the defendant's sleepwalking defense: (1) evi-
dence of sleepwalking at the time of the crime, (2) elapsed time be-
tween falling asleep and the criminal act, (3) medical factors, (4)
trigger factors, and (5) circumstantial evidence." ) Courts should adopt
a balancing test of these criteria when evaluating a sleepwalking de-
fense."9 If the court determines that evidence supporting the defen-
dant's claim of sleepwalking is credible, the jury should be instructed to
weigh the evidence to determine if the defendant was sleepwalking at
the time of the crime.") The relative weight of the five criteria depends
902 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 423, 426;
Masand et at., supra note 30, at 652.
908
	 supra note 52 and accompanying text.
304 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354-55; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
305 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 354; Howard & D'Orban, supra note 6, at 920; Ma-
howald et al., supm note 32, at 426.
3°° Howard & D'Orban, supra note 6, at 920; see Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
307 Sec Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
308 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Gilmore, supra note 33, at 455, 457-58; Ma-
howald et al., supra note 32, at 420, 426; Masand et al., supra note 30, at 652.
109 Sec Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
"° Sec Fenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Mahowald et al, supra note 32, at 426. A group
of doctors and lawyers analyzing the recent prosecution of Kenneth Parks (in Canada)
believe that the jury, in acquitting Parks on the charge of murder, employed a similar bal-
ancing test. See Broughton et al., supra note 206, at 263. Parks displayed most of the symp-
toms of sleepwalking outlined in this Note: the killing lacked motive, Parks had many
sleepwalkers in his family, the timing of the attack was not inconsistent with the length of a
sleepwalking episode and occurred within three hours of Parks falling asleep, and Parks
had been suffering from severe stress and anxiety prior to the attack. Id. at 256, 260-62.
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on the nature of the charge and the specific facts of the case. 3 " The
judge should instruct the jury to acquit if the jurors reasonably believe
the defendant was sleepwalking during the crime. 3"
4. Affirmative Defense
Fairness demands that defendants bear the burden of proving
sleepwalking. 3 " The defendant has the best access to evidence of
sleepwalking. 3 " A family history . of sleepwalking and previous instances
of sleepwalking are more readily obtained by the defendant than the
prosecution.3" Requiring an affirmative sleepwalking defense deters
unfounded sleepwalking defenses by placing the burden of proof on
the criminal defendant. 316
The sleepwalking defense presumes that defendants who prove
that they were sleepwalking at the time of the crime, and had no con-
trol over that behavior, should be acquitted. 517 The sleepwalking de-
fense would be a complete defense to criminal culpability. 318 Sleep-
walkers act without complete discretion over their actions and they
should not be held criminally culpable for actions they cannot rea-
sonably restrain . 319
CONCLUSION
On rare occasions, defendants facing criminal charges have
claimed they were sleepwalking during the crime and should not be
held culpable for their actions. Due to a lack of judicial and scholastic
precedent on the topic, courts have been inconsistent in trying these
defendants. The traditional response has been to treat sleepwalking as
an unconsciousness, automatism, or insanity defense, whereby defen-
dants must prove that they were mentally or physically incapacitated at
the time of the criminal act. Those defenses have offered little consis-
tency in application and have failed to respond to current medical
The jury acquitted Parks of murder, and the prosecution did not challenge the acquittal
on appeal. Id. at 263.
311
 SeeFenwick, supra note 5, at 353-55; Mahowald et al., supra note 32, at 426.
312 See Overton, 815 A.2d at 522.




917 See Davidson & Walters, supra note 143, at 19-20.
316 See id.
919 See HART, supra note 73, at 153; Saks, supra note 62, at 434.
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knowledge of sleepwalking, which suggests that sleepwalking is a
unique physiological disorder. In response, there should be a new,
separate sleepwalking defense, which takes into account the available
medical information on sleepwalking. The sleepwalking defense should
be a balancing test designed to provide juries with a consistent formula
for determining if the defendant was sleepwalking at the time of the
crime. It should be an affirmative defense, and the judge should in-
struct the jury to acquit if they believe the defendant was sleepwalking.
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